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Based on its aftermath, Cornelison v Kornbluth (1975) 15 C3d 590, 125 CR 557, has been a 
most remarkable case. Since its promulgation 26 years ago, it has generated two significant lines 
of decision. One—regarding the effect of a full credit bid—is represented in this issue in 
Kolodge v Boyd (2001) 88 CA4th 349, 105 CR2d 749. The other—concerning a mortgagor’s 
liability for waste—is covered in Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v 1333 N. Cal. Blvd. (2001) 86 
CA4th 486, 103 CR2d 421 (reported in 24 CEB RPLR 132 (Apr. 2001), which is the subject of 
this column. 
Cornelison held that one of the effects of California’s antidef ciency policies is to bar lenders’ 
actions for waste (technically, impairment of security) in all cases except when the waste is 
committed in bad faith. (This entire point was unnecessary, since the California Supreme Court 
took it all away in the final page of its opinion by holding that, even if the mortgagor had 
committed waste, it didn’t matter because the mortgagee had made a full credit bid. Had the full 
credit bid issue been decided first, we might have be n spared the court’s thinking about waste.) 
Background: Cornelison’s Economic Inventions 
It is important to separate Cornelison’s conclusions about waste from the reasoning it 
employed to get there. The opinion was written in the days when the supreme court often used a 
kind of pseudo-economic logic to justify its interpretations of California’s antideficiency statutes. 
This began with Roseleaf v Chierighino (1963) 59 C2d 35, 27 CR 873, in which Justice Traynor 
found economic justifications underlying the antidefici ncy rule of CCP §580b that no economist 
has ever been able to replicate.  
Cornelison took that type of thinking one step farther by holding that our antideficiency laws 
also had an effect on the law of waste, because of a perceived similarity of the two (15 C3d at 
603):  
It is clear that the two judgments against the mortgagor, one for waste and the other for a 
deficiency, are closely interrelated and may often reflect identical amounts. If property values in 
general are declining, a deficiency judgment and a judgment for waste would be identical up to 
the point at which the harm caused by the mortgagor is equal to or less than the general decline 
in property values resulting from market conditions. When waste is committed in a depressed 
market, a deficiency judgment, although reflecting the amount of the waste, will of course 
exceed it if the decline of property values is greater. However, when waste is committed in a 
rising market, there will be no deficiency judgment, unless the property was originally 
overvalued; in this event, there would be no damages for waste unless the impairment due to 
waste exceeded the general increase in property values.  
I have never been able to understand how the two judgments would be for identical amounts 
when there is both a general decline in market values and harm to the particular property; their 
effect should be cumulative, not identical. Nor can I see how a deficiency judgment in a 
depressed market would exceed a waste judgment only if the market decline is greater. The 
deficiency judgment should be larger in any case, because it combines both losses. Finally, it is 
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not clear to me why waste committed in a rising market would lead to a waste judgment but not a 
deficiency judgment when the impairment loss exceeds the market gain (if that is what the final 
quoted sentence means).  
On these shaky foundations, even shakier conclusions were drawn. First, the purchase money 
bar of CCP §580b was held to prohibit recovery for waste because it “would burden the 
defaulting purchaser with both loss of land and personal liability,” the so-called anti-depression 
second prong of the Roseleaf rationale for CCP §580b. Of course, the fact is that e debtor has 
failed to both pay the debt and care for the property. Furthermore, as the supreme court itself 
pointed out elsewhere, that loss has to be borne by somebody, and giving the debtor protection 
merely transfers it to the creditor, often a sold-out junior seller. See Spangler v Memel (1972) 7 
C3d 603, 102 CR 807. Second, the court then held that this prohibition did not apply if the waste 
was committed in “bad faith,” without explaining why the same depression-aggravating double 
loss would not then occur.  
The same logic was also applied to the nonjudicial sale bar of CCP §580d, which the court 
applied to bar a mortgagee from recovering for waste fter a trustee sale because that would have 
given him “the double benefits of an irredeemable tit o the property and a personal judgment 
against the mortgagor for the impairment of the value of the property.” 15 C3d at 604. And, 
again, this consequence was held acceptable in the case of bad faith waste.  
The overall effect of these rules is that a mortgagee confronted with ordinary (“good faith”) 
waste cannot do anything about it. If she holds a nonpurchase money mortgage, she can 
judicially foreclose and get a deficiency judgment covering her entire shortfall, but if her 
mortgage is purchase money or if she conducts a trustee sale rather than a judicial foreclosure, 
she is barred from a waste recovery. On the other hand, if she can demonstrate that the waste was 
committed in bad faith, she can avoid both deficieny barriers and obtain a waste judgment even 
though she holds a purchase money note and conducts a tru tee sale.  
What Is Bad Faith? 
Under the Cornelison standard, the critical inquiry is not whether waste occurred, but whether 
it was done in bad faith. This is a fact question, a d seems to depend mainly on motive. The 
court’s statement that “not all owners of real property subject to a purchase money mortgage 
commit waste solely or primarily as a result of theeconomic pressures of a market depression” 
(15 C3d at 604) suggests that waste committed solely because of economic stress may be good 
faith waste, while bad faith waste requires evidence of evil intent.  
There certainly was ready evidence of such intent in he Nippon case. The mortgagor’s 
outrageous behavior, together with his own damning testimony, made it easy for the jury to find 
him malicious. Any mortgagor who admits to having sufficient funds (indeed, with enough extra 
to siphon some off as well), and yet decides not to pay the taxes to “punish” the mortgagee, 
should not expect to do well on the good/bad faith issue. Clearly, this client should have been 
told to keep his mouth shut—during the workout negotiati ns and while on the stand. 
Threatening bankruptcy may be acceptable, but threatening nonpayment of property taxes is not. 
(It may still be safe to threaten to default on the debt payments, because there is as yet no such 
tort as “bad faith mortgage default,” but that could extend to threatening to withhold payments 
on the senior mortgage!) Moreover, the bad faith in th s case consisted of missing only one tax 
payment.  
We can assume that future debtors will be more cautious in what they say, but economic data 
may still get them in trouble. Even in the absence of intemperate language, can bad faith be 
found from the mere fact that the cash flow was sufficient to pay both the taxes and the mortgage 
debt? Would previous draws by the mortgagor make it bad faith for him not to reach into his own 
pocket to pay such expenses, even when the cash flow is insufficient? If a general market 
downturn can help prove the debtor’s bona fides, can that be offset by showing that he is 
generally solvent, even though this particular project is losing money? The Nippon facts were so 
lopsided in favor of the lender that they don’t give us much guidance for future, closer cases of 
this sort.  
What Is Waste? 
The bad faith features of Nippon should not obscure its counterpart holding that waste is not 
limited to physical noncare of the property. The trend toward including financial waste within its 
ambit is growing steadily, much supported by the new Restatement of Mortgages on that issue. I 
assume that failure to keep the property insurance i  force will also be regarded as waste, 
perhaps even in the absence of any casualty loss. I have hinted above at the possibility that a 
junior mortgagee may successfully claim that the mortgagor’s failure to keep the senior loan 
current constitutes the same kind of waste as hurts the enior lienor when the property taxes are 
not paid. Once financial waste becomes a respectabl concept, its contours are going to need a lot 
of mapping.  
Tort Law Versus Contract Law 
The Nippon debtor was held liable for compensatory and punitive damages despite the 
fact that his mortgage was nonrecourse and his foreclosure was nonjudicial, which shows how 
little contract law and conventional mortgage law have to do with the outcome. But there are still 
considerations that should affect loan document draf ing.  
In nonrecourse loans, carve-out clauses should be checked to make sure that they compel 
the debtor to behave properly. Even under California’s antideficiency rules, a carve-out is better 
than nothing, because it gives the mortgagee the option of judicially foreclosing and seeking a 
deficiency judgment (at least in nonpurchase money cases), whereas no such relief is available if 
the loan is completely nonrecourse. In California, a completely nonrecourse loan is like a 
purchase money loan, precluding both deficiency liability and ordinary waste liability. 
On the other hand, improved care-of-property covenants in the deed of trust won’t help 
too much (in California) because Cornelison’s reading of our deficiency rules denies mortgagees 
any basis for recovery in tort or contract. Bad faith waste is tortious, with or without covenants 
by the mortgagor to care for the property, so it doesn’t matter too much what the clauses say on 
this issue.  
Pay the Mortgage or Pay the Taxes? 
Everybody is wondering about liability for waste in the case of the mortgagor who lacks 
sufficient income to pay both the mortgage and the tax s; might he be guilty of bad faith waste if 
he uses the rents for mortgage payments instead of the taxes?  
A clause in the loan documents requiring tax payments to come first might have an 
impact here. Lenders treat tax defaults as early warning signs of potential trouble, and such 
clauses might make the case for waste somewhat stronger. Furthermore, in other states, carving 
out tax defaults from the general nonrecourse nature of the debt can subject the borrower to 
personal liability for nonpayment of taxes even though nonpayment of the debt itself remains 
nonrecourse. Under such circumstances, for his own sake, the mortgagor should be sure to pay 
the taxes first.  
Finally, to moralize a bit, as a society, shouldn’t we want to induce mortgagors to put the 
upkeep of their property ahead of keeping current on heir debt. As the Ninth Circuit said, when 
it refused to follow Cornelison in the case of federal loans, “[t]he aggravation of the downturn 
caused by such judgments is probably no worse than t e deleterious influence on the 
neighborhood of the deterioration which such judgments are designed to prevent.” U.S. v 
Haddon Haciendas Co. (9th Cir 1976) 541 F2d 777, 785. It may be onef the great ironies of 
California mortgage law that at the same time our antideficiency rules have pushed housing 
prices beyond the reach of many buyers, they have also contributed to the physical decline of 
that same housing stock. 
